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**TÍTULO:** Las principales etapas del renacimiento del Islam en Tatarstán.

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**RESUMEN:** El islam desempeñó un papel importante en la vida social y política de la República de Tatarstán a finales de los años 1980. Este documento analiza los principales períodos del resurgimiento del Islam en la República de Tatarstán en el período post-soviético: el período de legalización, el período de institucionalización, el período de estructuralización, el período de movilización interna, el período de definición ideológica y puntos de referencia teológicos. En particular, el período de legalización está asociado con la creación en 1992 de la Administración Espiritual de los Musulmanes de la República de Tatarstán y el retorno de los valores islámicos a la sociedad de Tatarstán.

**PALABRAS CLAVES:** Islam, renacimiento, instituciones islámicas, comunidad musulmana, Hanafi madhhab.

**TITLE:** The main stages of the revival of Islam in Tatarstan

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**ABSTRACT:** Islam played an important role in the social and political life of the Republic of Tatarstan in the late 1980s. This document analyzes the main periods of the resurgence of Islam in the Republic of Tatarstan in the post-Soviet period: the period of legalization, the period of institutionalization, the period of structuralization, the period of internal mobilization, the period of ideological definition and theological points of reference. In particular, the period of legalization is associated with the creation in 1992 of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan and the return of Islamic values to society in Tatarstan.

**KEY WORDS:** Islam, revival, Islamic institutions, Muslim community, Hanafi madhhab.

**INTRODUCTION.**

The “Islamic” factor in the social and political life of Tatarstan became the most significant phenomenon in the late 1980s (Yakupov, Valiulla 2005:23). This was originally connected not with the rebirth of Islam itself, but with the emergence of national social and political organizations that consider the Islamic factor as an essential component of national identity and a necessary attribute in the struggle for the sovereignty of Tatarstan. Therefore, the emergence of the first religious institutions in the republic was the result of the activities of these organizations.

**DEVELOPMENT.**

In 1992, an independent Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan (SAM RT) was established, on the one hand, as one of the manifestations of the national movement of the Tatars, and on the other, as completely inevitable in those conditions, decentralization of Muslim

communities (Mukhametshin R.M. 2009:154). This period was the first stage in the return of Islamic values to Tatarstan society, and therefore, 1988-1992 can be called the period of legalization.

The further spread and functioning of Islam in the social and political life of Tatarstan can also be conditionally divided into three more periods:

**1992-1998 became a period of institutionalization of Islam.** During this period, the main institutions of Islam appeared in the republic:

a) The formation of Muslim communities. This process, which began earlier, reached its apogee during this period. If in the year 1988, there were 18 Muslim communities, then by 1992, there were over 700. However, the number of communities continues to grow in the future, but the rates of their increase have been noticeably reduced. In the year 2000, there were about 950, and in the year 2001 around 1000. By the beginning of 2003, these figures had practically not changed.

b) The first Muslim educational institutions appeared by the year 1992; there were already more than 15. The largest and most prestigious among Muslims were the Muhammadiyah madrasa and the madrasa of the Millennium of Islam (Kazan), Yoldyz (Naberezhnye Chelny).

c) The institution of the Muslim clergy was revived. Basically, this process followed the path of transforming informal and uneducated rural mullahs into officially registered clergy. Nevertheless, we can say that the clergy was formed as a special social stratum (about 3 thousand). However, it was still too early to talk about special, different from other worldview attitudes, clergy behavioral stereotypes, since its heterogenicity (Raviot Jean-Robert. 1997:310). Those young people who studied in Muslim countries, first of all, in Saudi Arabia (by the beginning of the 90s, their number exceeded 100 people), did not make difference among the Muslim clergy.

d) The activation of the political activity of the Muslims of central Russia occurs in this period. Attempts were made to create Muslim and social organizations and political parties. This process begins with the creation of the Tatar social center (TSC) in 1989, which quite clearly outlined its position towards Islam as the most important component of spiritual revival. In the year 1990, the

first All-Russian Muslim party appeared - the Islamic Renaissance Party. In 1991, attempts were made to create regional Muslim parties too: the Islamic Democratic Party of Tatarstan, the All-Islamic Democratic Party in Ufa (Malashenko, Aleksei. 2001:318). In the same year, Abdulvahid Niyazov in Moscow organized the Islamic Cultural Center. In 1995, the Union of Muslims of Russia and the All-Russian Muslim social movement "Nur" appeared. In 1996, mufti of the Republic of Tatarstan Gabdulla Galiullin organized the movement "Muslims of Tatarstan".

e) The appearance of the main elements of the governance structure of Muslim communities (mahalla - muhtasibat - SAM RT) belongs to this period. But this period is characterized by the unsystematic emergence of numerous Muslim institutions. They were interconnected rather arbitrarily, mostly functioning independently (Mukhametshin R.M., 2010:60).

The political spectrum of Islam in the Volga-Ural region turned out to be quite unstable. One of the reasons was the rather weak social base of socio-political movements and parties (and not only religious ones). Their influence, even during the rise of the national movement in 1989-1992, was insignificant, according to sociologists. Thus, in August 1991, 6% considered themselves supporters of the TSC, Ittifak parties (they explained where, by whom and when it was created, the goals, size and nature of the activity, which differed from TSC and other parties) - 2.5% of the respondents. It should be borne in mind indeed that all the other parties operating in the Volga region (about 10) only won 10.6%. And 46.9% of respondents did not sympathize with any parties or organizations. In November 1997, 0.6% considered themselves supporters of the TSC (in Kazan - 0%), "Ittifak" - 0.6%.

It is possible that these indicators characterize the general situation in the region, and Russia more than the influence of individual parties and movements on the political consciousness of the masses, since "at the end of 1997, about 68% of respondents could not name any party that they would give their preference to". These data testify "about the continuing political disorientation of the mass consciousness", the inability of "the majority of citizens to identify themselves politically with any trend or party".

**The next stage, covering the period from 1998 to 2002, became the period of structuralization.**

This phase covers the period between the February 1998 and 2002 Congresses. This stage is characterized by the formation of the current system of governance of Muslim communities and other Islamic institutions. SAM RT became the only supreme body of the Muslims of the republic. It has its structural subdivisions in all 45 districts of Tatarstan - mukhtasibats, which organize the activities of 1 thousand local Muslim communities.

During this period, all Muslim educational institutions became structural subdivisions of the SCM RT, which, in turn, developed educational standards for them, the use of which led to a reduction in the number of accidentally established educational institutions. There are only 8 left, which was quite enough to meet the needs of Muslim communities in imams. More than a thousand shakirds (Mukhametshin R.M. 2017:147) studied there full-time and in absentia (not including students of Sunday schools).

We can say that in Tatarstan an efficient body has been established in the form of the SCM RT, which, with rare exceptions, generally managed the local situations.

**The period of internal mobilization between the II and III congresses - from 2002 to 2006.**

The period of internal mobilization covers between the II and III congresses - from 2002 to 2006, which stated the completion of the stage of fundamental structural and organizational transformations and focused on solving the internal problems of the Muslim communities of the republic:

- a) Training of religious leaders adapted to the local conditions, knowing the centuries-old traditions of the Muslims of the Middle Volga region able to organize local work within the framework of the traditional Hanafi madhhab for the Tatars.
- b) Identification of the internal reserves of the functioning of Muslim communities, the use of economic levers in the form of various taxes inherent to Muslims, the creation of an extensive

network of charitable organizations, the active use of the property (waqfs) that was transferred to the Muslims of Tatarstan.

Even today, Muslim communities do not have the means to support clergy and educational institutions, build or repair mosques and madrasas at their own expense. This makes it possible to conclude that the Muslim communities of Tatarstan, although they received state registration, but have not yet become an independent cell of the Muslim community. Therefore, the II Muslim Congress of Tatarstan in the year 2002 declared the creation of full-fledged Muslim communities its priority task, but their basic principles of functioning remain an open question, in fact, even after the congress.

What form should it have after its recreation in modern conditions? The fact is that the classical Muslim community is a product of an agrarian-traditional society, and today, we can talk about their rebirth in an industrial or industrial-oriented society. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that in an industrial society, people are united not so much by traditional personal relationships and affections within their religious community, as by goals and symbols that have been turned into ideologies. Islam today has ceased to be only a form of family and community identity and become an essential element of ethnic identity and ideological understanding of modern reality.

Religious leaders of this period had not yet formed formulas for solving the problems encountered, but there was an understanding that they should be solved at the expense of internal reserves, without forming a consumer psychology.

### **The period of determination of ideological and theological landmarks.**

After the 2006 Congress, the Muslim community of Tatarstan entered a very important stage of its formation. It took shape organizationally and structurally, but was not defined in the ideological and theological guidelines and basic principles of its existence. The special significance of this stage lies in the fact that it was necessary to make great intellectual efforts in order to clearly define the future guidelines of the Islamic revival in Tatarstan.

The problem of theological disagreements in the Russian Muslim community has quite objective reasons, the onset of which leads not only to the beginning of the 1990s, but, possibly, even earlier (Noack Christian. 2001:9).

### **Discussions.**

One of the reasons for theological controversy virtually lies on the surface. In the early 1990s, young people went abroad to receive religious education, having already gradually returning to Russia. There is no doubt that they were brought up completely in other traditions. Young people may be returning sincere Muslims. But they went abroad immediately after school, without having any religious training. They were raised from scratch in that environment, and returning, naturally, they believe that they were taught the basics of true Islam. Such young people today are in all parts of Russia. Today they represent practically the most educated part of the Muslim clergy.

The other side of this problem lies in the fact that if in the 1990s they complained about negative external influence, today this influence has become an internal problem. Today, practically no foreign Islamic philanthropic foundations and teachers from other countries work in Russia, but many young people studying in religious schools have returned from abroad. This Russian youth, educated in Muslim countries and being the carrier of the same ideology that the Arabs used to propagate, representing the most educated part of the Muslim community, this group of Muslim clergy exerts more influence on the youth than a small number of followers of the Hanafi traditions (Osipova, N.O., 2017:22).

There is an understanding in society that the revival of these traditions is a priority today and requires serious intellectual and theological efforts, but today, the Muslim community is not yet ready to comprehend the deep essence of the theological traditions of the Hanafi madhhab. Perhaps this is due to the fact that there is practically no Muslim intelligentsia capable of discussing serious theological problems.

## CONCLUSIONS.

Nevertheless, recent publications make it possible to assert that the intellectual quest for the fate of Islam in Russian society has reached a new level. The euphoria that is quite natural for the first years of religious renewal is gradually being replaced by serious reflections on the essence of Islam, which Muslims need, first of all, the Tatars. They express completely different, sometimes opposite points of view. And this is quite natural, since no society (not only in Muslim) has ever had an unanimous opinion about the forms of manifestation, the scope of application and the prospects for the development of religion.

In the XIX - early XX century, the Tatar society plunged into the argument between representatives of cadimism and jadidism (Noack Christian, 1997:95), but today, the situation in this area is much more complicated.

Until the beginning of the XX century, the disputes were fought by the Muslim intelligentsia, which analyzed the processes both from within and from the standpoint of Islam, and therefore, there were many points of contact between its various strata, even between ideological opponents.

Now, the Tatar intelligentsia is ideologically more diverse, and for the most part, secular, so the attitude to Islam and the processes around it is, in fact, an outsider view. This, of course, brings a negative connotation to these disputes, since it creates a lot of opportunities for creating artificial structures that have their own internal logic, but do not always take into account the particularities of the dogmatic ritual component of Islam.

Nevertheless, the emergence of not only the individual but also whole conceptual ideas about the development of Islam in Tatar society, of course, is a timely and positive phenomenon. They, in essence, create a certain intellectual environment where heated debates and the search for the essence and optimal forms of realization and use of Islam in Tatar society takes place.

Therefore, among the Muslims of Tatarstan, theological differences arise from the current difficult situation in the Muslim community. The situation is complicated by the fact that the distribution of theological ideas that are not characteristic of Tatars is somewhat half-hearted. Difficult ideological

aspects hide behind a single legal framework, that is, while observing the legal principles of Islam on the Hanafi madhhab, some Muslims adhere to completely different ideological attitudes. Therefore, among the Muslims who believe themselves as Hanafi, there are many opponents of the Majlis on certain dates, visits to the ancient Bulgars, etc.

The results of these theological disagreements, unfortunately, go far beyond purely theological disputes. Theology with various approaches today is an effective tool for educating Muslim youth in Muslim educational institutions, mosques and in various formal and informal circles.

The complexity and ambiguity of the situation in the region lies in the fact that the process of radicalization proceeds at the level of changing the ritual system. These changes are presented to the unprepared person unfamiliar with the specifics of the Muslim ritual system as a return to the fold of true Islam (Musina, Rozalinda, 1997:260).

Since radicalization occurs mainly within the framework of theological ideas only, there was no serious reason for the authorities to take any measures against these communities. The official Islamic institutions represented by the spiritual administrations also practically do not deal with this problem. They themselves are also far from Islamic values traditional for Muslims of Russia.

The “export” of theological traditions alien to Russian Muslims for them is associated with religious values, which were formed in a full-fledged Muslim society, and therefore, are fully capable of being a form of Islamic revival. Being cut off from the centuries -old theological traditions of the Muslims of Russia-, the main part of modern Muslim leaders cannot look at alien traditions critically, because they do not know other values they could rely on.

The elections of the new mufti in Tatarstan in the year 2013 were called a milestone event not by accident. In the republic, a new team came to the leadership of the SCM RT, which realizes the need for fundamental changes in the understanding of theological traditions. However, time will tell whether these changes will become a new stage of Islamic revival in Russia.

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