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**TÍTULO:** La familia tradicional: los invariantes institucionales del desarrollo en el sur de Rusia.

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**RESUMEN:** Las alternativas institucionales para el desarrollo de una familia tradicional en Daguestán provienen de las imágenes existentes de este tipo de familia en la sociedad Daguestán. Los autores del estudio sostienen la posición de que, dado a la dinámica de cualquier fenómeno y proceso tiene lugar en el espacio entre lo real y lo ideal, la modernización tradicional seguirá prevaleciendo, preservando la probabilidad de la existencia de una alternativa al desarrollo institucional de la familia tradicional en la sociedad moderna de Daguestán, con un enfoque en la conexión coordinada de los fundamentos tradicionales de la vida familiar y aquellos elementos innovadores que no amenazan la preservación de la cultura tradicional de los pueblos de Daguestán de acuerdo con los resultados del estudio.

**PALABRAS CLAVES:** tradiciones, innovaciones, familia tradicional, familia Daguestán, familia y matrimonio.

**TITLE:** The traditional family: the institutional invariants of development on the South of Russia.

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**ABSTRACT:** Institutional alternatives for the development of a traditional family in Dagestan are from the existing images of this type of family in Dagestan society. The authors of the study hold the position that since the dynamics of any phenomena and processes takes place in the space between the real and the ideal. The traditional modernization will remain prevalent preserving the probability of the existence of an alternative to the institutional development of the traditional family in the modern Dagestan society with a focus on the coordinated connection of the traditional foundations of family life and those innovative elements that do not threaten the preservation of the traditional culture of the Dagestan peoples according to the results of the study.

**KEY WORDS:** traditions, innovations, traditional family, Dagestan family, family and marriage.

## **INTRODUCTION.**

Family and marriage sphere is one of the most important in the subject space of ethnozoological research of Dagestan peoples because of its enduring role in the preservation and reproduction of ethnic culture and structure of the region in all its national diversity. Dagestan family is the bearer of a specific ethnic traits and channel of broadcast of ethnic and cultural values to the younger generation to this day. It is attracting close attention of scientists to study unique characteristic changes and evaluate them from the standpoint of contemporary reality and determine the vector of further development (see: *Alimova, Ibragimov, 2016; Alimova, 2011*).

The factors that cause particular concern to the Dagestan public, including scientific ones, are the phenomena and processes that, despite the preservation of the conservative appearance of the Dagestan family, indicate the trends of destruction of its traditional foundations. It is expressed in the decrease in the stability of family-marriage relations and the growth of conflict potential and the increasing dynamics of divorce in Dagestan families (*Kurbanova, 2013: 104*).

These problems require a deep sociological understanding of their sources and consequences for the functioning of the traditional family (*Tambiyants et al., 2017*) as the basic unit of Dagestan society. Study of the traditional family in Dagestan with its institutional transformation and crisis factors that determine the vectors of its development is important by the inclusion in a wide sociological context of the problems traditionally studied from the standpoint of ethnographic (*Shakbanova et al., 2018*) and historical science by Dagestan scientists.

The space of the relationship between traditional and innovative in the matrimonial sphere of the Dagestan society is controversial as the resuscitation of a number of archaic elements of family life in the course of their implementation in a real family practice does not match the logic of transformation of the traditional family. That is associated with having a place in the Dagestan environment egalitarians family relationships. There is a situation when the full restoration of the

traditional family in its archaic version, based on Patriarchal foundations and religious precepts is no longer possible. But the efforts in this direction are an obstacle to the development of the nuclear family in its modern format, based on egalitarian values (*Vaskov, et al., 2018*). This is a state of balance between traditional and innovative in the functioning of the Institute of traditional family in Dagestan. There is a turbulent space as well as a migration space. (*Gryshai et al., 2018*). There are options for the development of family relations which depending on many factors that can change the ratio of traditional and innovative in one direction or another with the corresponding consequences archaization of traditional family or its innovation or egatariating.

## **DEVELOPMENT.**

### **Methods.**

includes the results of sociological research conducted on the theme "Transformation of the traditional Dagestani family" in 2016 in Dagestan in Botlikh, Derbent, Kazbekovskiy, Kayakentsky, Kizilyurt, and Karabudakhkent, Kizlyar, Lak, Levashinsky, Novolak, Khasavyurt district, in Derbent, Kaspiysk, Kizlyar, Kizilyurt and Makhachkala, Khasavyurt. Distribution of respondents by ethnicity is as follows: Avars – 29,2 %, Agulls – 1,0 %, Azerbaijanis – 4,5 per cent, Dargins – 16,9 per cent, Kumyks -14,8 per cent, Laks and 5.5 per cent, Lezgins – 13,2 per cent, Russians – 3,6 per cent, Rutuls – 0,9 per cent, Tabasarans – 4.1 per cent, Chechens – 3,2 per cent, Tsakhurs – 0,3 per cent. There is men – 48,1 per cent, women – 51,9 per cent by gender.

### **Study result.**

There is traditional and innovative in the modern family and marriage sphere for studying of the traditional family in Dagestan. We are interested the respondent's attitude to traditional family values and their focus on their maintenance or ignoring against the background of the radical changes taking place in modern Dagestan society.

We asked the respondents a question "To what extent are family traditions and customs observed in modern Dagestan society?" in our empirical study. There is the position in the minds of respondents that family traditions in Dagestan are not fully observed (54,4 per cent) prevails according to the results of our study. By ethnic that opinion was shared by more than half of the respondents among the Avars, Dargins, Lak, Kumyk and Russians and as well as in subgroups of believers, believers and non-believers. Every second among Lezgins and hesitant and every third among Chechens shared that opinion. The share of those who hold this position increases with educational status 51,3 per cent with secondary, 49,7 per cent with secondary special and 60,2 per cent with higher education. There were more women who were convinced that family traditions and customs were not fully respected in Dagestan society (57,4 per cent), as opposed to every second male Respondent (48,7 per cent) by gender. This position is a dominant in the subgroup of Dagestan believers. This opinion allows us to consider that the traditional foundations of family life in Dagestan society have already shaken. The Dagestan people do not believe that you need to follow all the traditions absolutely that previously determined the content and nature of the family and marriage sphere of life of Dagestan society.

We paid attention to the position of respondents noting that all family traditions are honored in rural areas in contrast to the city. There are respected "only some family traditions and customs" (40,3 per cent). There is this position among every second respondent among the Avars, Dargins, Laks, Lezgins in a subgroup of believers and unbelievers and every third among the Chechens, Kumyks, Russians and self-identifying as non-believers. The proportion of those who believe that all family national traditions and customs of the Dagestan peoples in rural areas compared with the city going down with the growth of the educational level. There are the respondents of 45,8 per cent with secondary, 40,1 per cent with secondary special and 36,4 per cent with higher education.

Every fifth respondent claims that it is observed all family traditions and customs fully in modern Dagestan society. By ethnicity this answer was shared by every third respondent in the group of believers and there are among Kumyks, Lezgins and Russian by every fourth and among the Dargin believers by each fifth respondent. There are 25,6 per cent with secondary education and 22,1 per cent average and 18,9 per cent higher. There is opinion that only some observe family traditions and customs in rural areas and do not observe family traditions and customs in urban areas. That opinion shares one in four respondents among the faithful unbelievers and every fifth respondent among unbelievers, every sixth respondent among the Avars, every seventh respondent among the Dargins, every eighth respondent among the Laks and among believers and hesitant, every ninth among the Lezgins, every tenth among the Kumyks. This fact showed a complex and contradictory processes in the spiritual and moral sphere of the modern Dagestan society.

The transformations taking place in the post-Soviet space worsened the spiritual sphere and spiritual health among the Dagestan peoples. One hand, that transformations gave people broad freedom and opportunities in almost all spheres of social interaction. On the other, the strengthening of the religious factor and the role of the clergy, which sought to influence almost all spheres of human life, had not always positive consequences for social well-being (*Natalya et al.*, 2018).

There is the perception of religious rites as national traditions of the peoples with the Islamic faith in mind of the Dagestan peoples. They are identified when the religious norms of behavior act as components of the national ethics and etiquette very often. For example, the traditions of secular forms of marriage are replaced by religious ritual Mavlid. It should be noted that Mavlid wedding is a phenomenon later. It became widespread in the last ten to fifteen years. Dagestan anthropologists show the groom's wedding was held widely and cheerfully, with songs, dances, dramatizations, mummers in the traditional Dagestan society on the basis of field material. The family celebration turned into an all-village celebration. The whole society (Jamaat) took part in that. Mavlid was

carried out in rare occasions. For example, family or anyone tukhum was in distress. The bride's wedding was more modest. It was called "quiet wedding". Thus, we can note there are the change of the wedding ceremony-the transition in the family and marriage sphere of the Dagestan peoples belonging to Islam. There is not alcoholic with the singing of nashids (Muslim sings performed traditionally only men or children's vocals (in chorus or solo) without musical instruments. Using of musical (instrumental) accompaniment is not allowed by the authoritative opinion of the Muslim theologians' majority.

Religious revival in the republics of the spread of Islam was accompanied by the growth of religious extremism. There was the Wahhabis ideology in the religious space of Dagestan. The result of the Wahhabis ideology is a tough intra-Islamic confrontation between traditional Islam and Wahhabism. Also, it is draws attention to the appearance of young Dagestan women. They began to wear hijab. It is not traditional clothes for the Dagestan people. It should be noted that this form of clothing of a young girl draws attention young people not only in rural but also in urban areas. It has a great importance for them when they marry. He (a young man) is initially focused on creating a family with a "closed girl". The Dagestan researchers pay attention on this fact. They assent that such orders in regard to the woman require Muslim religious dogmas which have never been characteristic for Dagestan woman. There is a retreat and hijab and etc. Modern clergy appeals to the Dagestan women with that appeal. They not only force their wives and daughters to wear hijab but also, they call to carry out all the policies, procedures the women of Dagestan preached by Islam (*Agashirinova*, 2008: 60). The husband is forced to wear a hijab the young wife after marriage very often. If wife refuses it may lead to divorce.

Historical experience shows that the woman was never in the position of slaves and never wore no chavchak, neither the parandzha, nor chadra and etc. in Dagestan. She always wore Chohtu which is not fully covered the hair on his head. When entering the street, she wore a headscarf on top of

Chohtu. The costume (hijab) widespread in modern Dagestan is traditional clothes of the woman of the Arab countries. In this context, it sounds perfectly legitimate question known Dagestan ethnographer, familist Agashirnova "And what happens now, if you follow these principles Dagestan women? It turns out that our Dagestan women should wear an Arabic costume, not their national one. Why modern mullahs call to dress on girls in someone else's traditional costume almost 3 – 4 years". She gives the following sad prediction. There is unclear what we will come in ten years when all women will go to hijab or wear a parangzha. We have not a right to encourage these calls Dagestan mullahs. We now live in different socio-economic conditions, but we do not live in the medieval period" (Agashirnova, 2008: 61).

We asked the "control question" "Do you observe the traditions and customs of your people in your family?" for a more in-depth analysis of the changes taking place in modern Dagestan society in our study. This question allows you to set the declared and real behavior. The results of our study showed that there is opinion "in my family, respect only some national traditions and customs of my people" in the mind of Dagestan peoples. This opinion was shared by 56,2 per cent of the respondents. There are 60,1 per cent of Dargins, 61,5 per cent of Laks, 63,0 per cent of Russian and 60,7 per cent of the Chechens by ethnicity.

It should be noted that Russians and Chechens are not autochthonous ethnic groups in the region. The area of their national culture is outside Dagestan. This probably explains the situation related to their attitude to family traditions and customs. By educationally 59,2 per cent of respondents with secondary, 53,6 per cent of secondary special and 55,5 per cent of higher education also stressed that their family observes only some national traditions and customs of their people. By gender the answers were distributed in the same way as for the perception of the situation at the level of the whole society. There were slightly more men (about 39,8 per cent) compared to women (34,0 per cent) among those who believe that their family is absolutely all traditions and customs. There is a

opinion "it is observe all national traditions and customs of my people in my family" on the second position. That position was marked by every second respondent in the Lezgin subgroup, every third among the Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Laks as well as in all educational subgroups, every fourth among Russians and Chechens. By gender the above opinion was shared by 51,0 per cent of men and a significantly higher proportion of women (59,1 per cent).

At the same time, the positions that "there are not reasons do not observe the national traditions and customs of my people at all in my family" and "my family does not consider it necessary to observe the national traditions and customs of my people" were marked by a statistically small proportion of respondents – 3,8 per cent and 2,2 per cent, respectively. There are distinguished the Chechens (every twelfth respondent) and Russians (every fourteenth respondent) by ethnicity. The proportion of those who hold the opinion that their family for certain reasons practically does not adhere to the national traditions and customs of their people is almost 2 times higher among the men interviewed compared with women – 4,5 per cent and 2,9 per cent, respectively.

Thus, the perception of family reality at the level of the whole Dagestan society coincided with the individual assessment of this reality. At the same time, it is important to understand that the level of education of respondents does not affect the nature of the life of the Dagestan family in terms of adherence to traditions and customs. There are no significant differences in the responses of respondents, both with higher education and without it by the results of our empirical study. The respondents with secondary education stand out by a small margin who showed less commitment to the traditions and customs in the family than representatives with higher and secondary special education. This situation makes us think about what determines the nature of family practices in Dagestan, what factors influence the family orientations of Dagestan peoples? It seems to us that micro - and macro-environment factors play a significant role. They determine the general background of the development of the family sphere of Dagestan which is prone for trends both

liberalization and traditionalization of family relations. The person socialized in these conditions, regardless of the level of education received afterwards, remains committed to the values and orientations obtained in the course of family socialization.

It should be noted that the factors of family socialization play a dominant role for the Dagestan peoples. Family value continues to remain at the highest level occupying a leading position in the system of value hierarchy by the results of study. There are some changes in the reproductive attitudes of Dagestan society and especially among young generation. We are talking about the fact that the reproductive attitudes of Dagestan youth no longer reflect the focus on a large number of children in the family.

The Dagestan youth shows higher rates in comparison with the all-Russian data. The young Dagestan planned to have from 2 to 4 children (with most young people focused on a three-year family) as noted by scientists who surveyed the student youth of Dagestan. But Dagestan has always been famous for its large number of children. Because the presented indicators are not high by the authors of this study. The emerging trend of declining birth rates in Dagestan in the post-Soviet period is also a reflection of the detraditionalization of the family sphere despite the fact that there are the high rates on this demographic criterion among other Russian regions.

Despite the fact that archaic traditions are beginning to revive in the Dagestan society in the sphere of family relations, the modern trends, which are reflected in family practices in other regions of Russia, associated with the liberalization of the family sphere and the transformation of gender relations, are not yet supported in the Dagestan environment. In this case we are talking about the illegitimate birth rate and the attitude of Dagestan peoples to it. Before the resulting sociological material will be presenting it is necessary to refer to the content of the phenomenon of "illegitimate birth". By the famous familist S.I.Golod's opinion it has become a real fact. According to the all-Russian data, the share of illegitimate births in the total number of births began to grow in the

1970<sup>th</sup>. The number of births outside registered (illegitimate) marriage increased by 31,8 per cent between 2000 and 2004, maintaining the trend of changes since 1994. As a result, the share of births outside marriage continues to grow and has already reached almost 30 per cent of the total number of births. There is the share of non-marital births in the cities in 2003 (28,6 per cent) and 32,6 per cent is among rural population.

One important factor is unambiguously interpreted the absolute and relative increase in illegitimate births as an increase in the birth rate of single mothers. The number of births registered on the basis of an application from both parents is increasing even faster than the total number of births outside the registered marriage. This category of births increased by 37,1 per cent compared to 1999. There is a reducing the rate of increase of the births registered on the basis of the statement of one mother in last years. The proportion of out-of-wedlock newborns recognized by their fathers was close to half in 2003 (48,4 per cent) (it is most often with the full consent of the child's mother in practice). The proportion of births that are registered on the basis of the joint statement of parents in the total number of non-marital births increased continuously among the urban population since the late 1980<sup>th</sup>. The proportion was 36,6 per cent in 1980. The proportion exceeded a half of all non-marital births (50,5 per cent) for the first time in history in 2003.

We were interested in the attitude of the Dagestan people to the appearance of a child outside the officially registered relations between parents in our study. We asked the question "How do you feel about illegitimate birth (when a woman decides to become a mother, not married)?" There is a negative assessment of illegitimate birth (54,6 per cent) by respondents. They said that the child should grow up in a full family. This opinion was marked by more than half of the respondents in all ethnic subgroups except for a markedly smaller proportion of Russian (every third respondents) and Laks (every second respondents). They have a tolerant position to having a child outside an officially concluded marriage. There is a negative attitude towards extramarital birth among 55,0

per cent of men and 54,6 per cent of women by gender and among 56,5 per cent of respondents with secondary, 52,4 per cent of secondary specialized and 54,4 per cent of higher education. Every fourth respondents consider such a step of a woman as an immoral act.

There is the share of those among the Avars and Laks (every third respondents) and every fourth among the Dargins and Lezgins and every sixth among the Kumyks and Chechens. This opinion is shared by a statistically small proportion of Russians. By sex 29,3 per cent of men and a smaller proportion of women (23,4 per cent) respondents with secondary (28,6 per cent), secondary special (19,9 per cent) and higher education (26,6 per cent) characterize this phenomenon as immoral. Every fourth respondents have a negative assessment of illegitimate births with the motivation "an illegitimate child will be insecure and feel uncomfortable among their peers". The Avars and Dargins have a same opinion and every fifth respondents among Lezgins and Laks. There is least among the Kumyks with that opinion (every eight respondents) and Russians (every eleventh respondents). By gender 22,0 per cent of men and 23,2 per cent of women, as well as 24,1 per cent of respondents with secondary, 21,7 per cent of secondary special and 22,7 per cent of higher education demonstrate their concern for the psychological state of the child who may experience discomfort among peers. If he will face an insult to his personal dignity that we also cannot be discounted. 16,0 per cent of men, 18,4 per cent of women, 17,2 per cent of secondary, 18,1 per cent of specialized secondary and 17,8 per cent of higher education, one in three among Russians, one in five among Laks, Lezgins and Kumyks, one in six among Dargins and Avars have a positive opinion to the illegitimate birth rate. The position of Chechens is noticeably smaller in comparison with other ethnic groups. 16,2 per cent of men and 15,8 per cent of women respondents with an average (14,1 per cent), secondary special (18,7 per cent), higher education (15,4 per cent) support the decision of a woman out of wedlock to give birth to a child with the motivation of her "free

choice". By nationality the share of such is higher among Russians (every third respondent) and Chechens (every fourth respondent), while among the rest of respondents is less than 20 per cent.

The attitude of respondents to the illegitimate birth rate is largely determined by religious attitudes. We can see in the context of respondents' attitude to religion by the results of the study. There is a negative approach to illegitimate births among 58,5 per cent strongly believer, among 55,5 per cent of believers. They have opinion to raise the "child in a full family". There is a low proportion with a negative an assessment for non-marital birth in the positions of hesitate (44,7 per cent), unbelievers (33,3 per cent) and strongly of unbelievers (50,0 hesitate).

A group of strongly believing and strongly unbelievers considers the decision of a woman to become a mother as immoral if she is not married. There are 21,2 per cent, 11,7 per cent and 25,0 per cent of non-believers with that opinion. One in three respondents among the hesitate, one in four among believers and believers, one in five among believers and one in eight among unbelievers notes that the illegitimate child will be "have a complex and feel uncomfortable among peers". The positive perception of illegitimate births is demonstrated by subgroups of strongly non – believers (41,7 per cent), non-believers (29,2 per cent) and hesitate (24,3 per cent) while the percentage among believers and strongly believers is significantly less 18,9 per cent and 10,0 per cent, respectively. This approach of the first three groups is complemented by the opinion of the free choice of a woman when deciding on the birth of a child. There is 33,3 per cent of non-believers, 27,2 per cent of hesitant and 16,7 per cent of strongly non-believers as opposed to 6,9 per cent of strongly believers and 16,5 per cent of believers. We can see the contradictory positions when analyzing the obtained sociological information. The strongly unbelievers have an assessment for the illegitimate birth as the right of every woman to become a mother and calling it an immoral act.

The same contradiction can be noted in the opinions of believers. On the one hand, they have negative opinion to a woman's decision to become a mother in an informal marriage. But they consider such an act as "the free choice of every woman". However, this impression does not fully reflect the realities about the positions of respondents in relation to religion. For example, there is priority of Sharia marriage over the officially concluded in the Registry office (26,6 per cent) in the Dagestan peoples. If the Orthodox Church permitted wedding ceremony at any time, but there is a hard-fixed rule in Islam. This ceremony must be held before the wedding. This ritual is of great importance for Muslims. You can still find a generation that allows ignoring the marriage of the Islamic canons in the urban, that there are clearly defined rules in rural areas.

Thus, it can be said that Russian respondents are not so categorical. They believe that every woman has the right to free choice of her life strategy in their majority. Therefore, should not be negative about her decision to become a mother, even if she is not married. The Avar and Lezgin respondents had a categorical opinion. They are characterizing such an act as immoral. A difference has not been recorded by gender. Both men and women had negative and positive opinion to this question in our study. There is a difference that a greater number of men the act of women admitted immoral in comparison with the respondents of women. We can understand it. The women more understand the motives of such a choice of women choosing to have a baby without being married.

According to Golod, sexual relations before marriage, the birth of a child out of marriage and the intrinsic value of erotic communication between husband and wife were considered a violation of socio-cultural norms. Violators of the customs used a variety of tough sanctions (*Golod, 2012: 21*).

Pushkareva based on the comparative analysis of the principles of family and sexual ethics in Orthodoxy and Catholicism concludes that the methods of "intimidation" were not prevalent in the Orthodox concept of marriage and family to women and sexual ethics not in the early stages, in X – XIII centuries when Byzantine translated texts had circulation in Russia widely.

This is not later, when the Russian Orthodox Church formed its approach to the thoughts and feelings of people. Orthodoxy appealed to the conscience of the person himself. His internal self-control had to perform the function of a life regulator.

Orthodoxy demonstrated tolerance in assessing human behavior in comparison with Catholicism. There is punishment of women for premarital relations, manifestation of sexuality, conflict life of a married couple, adultery and etc. They were not very severe, as in the countries of the spread of Catholicism and in most cases reduced to fasting a certain number of days, months, less than 1-2 years, numerous bows, sincere repentance and repentance" (*Pushkareva*. 1995: 57). In other words, the normative sociocultural requirements and actual practices in the European pre-capitalist society depended on the specific conditions of place and time and did not coincide with each other in one way or another. There is a family of this type comes down to procreation during the whole period (*Golod*, 2012: 21).

At the same time, unconventional acts did not exclude the support of the idea of marriage and marriage birth rate as a social norm in the public mind. If we have in mind Russia, the marriages had a universal character until the end of the nineteenth century. By the age of 45 – 49 years, only 4 per cent of men and 5 per cent women respectively remained unmarried (*Volkov*, 1986: 108). We can argue that the institution of marriage had a monopoly on the regulation of sexual relations and the reproduction of children from the time of the Roman Empire until the end of the XIX century (*Golod*, 2012: 22).

When we are considering the attitude of the surveyed Dagestan peoples to the illegitimate birth rate, it is necessary to pay attention to the state of the woman herself, who is taking such a step. In addition, it would be wrong to consider the illegitimate birth rate as a specific feature of Russian society. So, the researchers note that the growth of non-marital birth is a universal trend in the last decades of the XX century. There are and age specificity of children born out of wedlock. The birth

of an illegitimate child was characteristic of very young mothers (up to 20 years) not so long ago and for mothers older than 30 years (*Golod*, 1984: 6). Now the illegitimate birth rate is characteristic of all ages equally. The share of births outside the registered marriage grew most intensively in the age of maximum marriage, reaching in the ages of 20 to 35 years 25-27 per cent. The institutional space of the Dagestan traditional family is developing at the intersection of formal and informal norms at the present stage and rules governing family relations in Dagestan and derived from the norms of law enshrined throughout Russia (some researchers call it positive law), Muslim law and customary law. The latter, as the primary in relation to the Muslim, was largely absorbed by Muslim (Sharia) law for centuries. Therefore, their division is conditional in some cases but necessary, because adat or customary law still retains its regulatory potential in Dagestan. Specially among the mountain peoples. Alternatives to the development of the institution of traditional family are largely determined by the nature of the transformation of formal and informal rules and norms governing family relations as well as by which of them are dominant at the moment.

## **CONCLUSIONS.**

The results of the empirical study showed that the new norms and values are difficult to assess unambiguously in the institutional space of the modern Dagestan family but the trends associated with the return to some of the long-forgotten family traditions which include polygamy and early marriages.

The spread of archaic phenomena in the family environment of modern Dagestan is a consequence of the Islamization of the population of the Republic and a reflection of the growing importance of religious values and attitudes. The implementation of a number of archaic traditions in the real family practice of the peoples of Dagestan creates a contradictory space of correlation between

traditional and innovative in the family sphere of Dagestan society, which is reflected in the differences in the ideal and real images of the family.

The image of the ideal family for Dagestan society at the moment can be characterized by the following features. There is officially registered marriage as a priority over Sharia or "civil" types of marriage. There are children in the family. There is a separation from parents (nuclear type of organization of family life – spouses and children). There is a focus on endogamy (primarily in the context of religious affiliation, and then – ethnic). The basis of family is love and respect. Their loss is a serious reason for divorce. But there is a negative perception of illegitimate birth with very different motivation in the mind of the Dagestan peoples. There is a positive assessment of such a step by a woman.

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