TÍTULO: Sobre las formas de optimizar el papel de algunas organizaciones internacionales del mundo para resolver los conflictos del Cáucaso meridional.

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RESUMEN: De 1992 a 2005, el Grupo OSCE Minsk presentó tres propuestas como base para las negociaciones, que no condujeron a una solución del conflicto. En abril-julio de 2006, los copresidentes del Grupo de Minsk publicaron una declaración e hicieron varias declaraciones, que revelaron parte de las propuestas para un acuerdo. Estas propuestas incluyeron una retirada gradual de las fuerzas armenias y la desmilitarización de los territorios que rodean Nagorno-Karabakh, un régimen especial para los distritos de Lachin y Kelbajar y un referéndum que finalmente determinara el estado de Nagorno-Karabakh. También se suponía que las fuerzas de paz internacionales en la zona de conflicto y la asistencia internacional para desminado y restauración de los territorios ocupados y las regiones de Nagorno-Karabakh afectadas por la guerra y los desplazados internos que regresaban.

PALABRAS CLAVES: Cáucaso meridional, Naghorno Karabakh, conflicto, Grupo Minsk.

TITLE: About the ways of optimizing the role of some international organizations of the world for the resolving South Caucasus conflicts.
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ABSTRACT: From 1992 to 2005, OSCE Minsk Group presented three proposals as basis for negotiations, which, however, did not lead to a settlement of the conflict. On April-July 2006, the co-Chairs of the Minsk Group published a statement and made several statements, which revealed part of the proposals for a settlement. These proposals included a phased withdrawal of Armenian forces and the demilitarization of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, a special regime for the Lachin and Kelbajar districts and a referendum that will finally determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. International peacekeepers in the conflict zone and international assistance in demining and restoring the occupied territories and regions of Nagorno-Karabakh affected by the war and returning internally displaced persons were also supposed.

KEY WORDS: South Caucasus, Naghorno Karabakh, conflict, Minsk Group

INTRODUCTION.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, referred to as "Madrid", was presented to the parties in November 2007 in Madrid.

Since 2005, with the support of the OSCE, the delegations of Azerbaijan and Armenia began to discuss the fourth “mixed” (“package-phased”) plan, which presupposes a preliminary agreement on the basic principles. The basic principles include the following provisions:

- Return of the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh under the control of Azerbaijan.


- Providing a corridor linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh.
• Determination of the future final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh by legally binding Will.
• Return of all internally displaced persons and refugees to their former homes
• International security guarantees and peacekeeping operations (G8 Summit).

**DEVELOPMENT.**

Despite the fact that the text of the proposals was not published, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov stated that they supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and Armenian Foreign Minister V. Oskanian (2018) asserted that the principles supported Armenia’s position on the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh.

March 14th in 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on Armenia to immediately and without conditions releases the occupied territories of Azerbaijan with 39 votes in favor, 7 against and 100 abstentions. The co-chair countries of the Minsk Group (USA, Russia, and France) were against the adoption of this resolution, since it, in their opinion, is one-sided. However, they indicated that despite their voting on the document, they support the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

On June 28, 2008, the Russian co-chairman of the Minsk Group, Yuri Merzlyakov, stated that only 4 of the 14-15 basic principles cause disagreements of the parties, and “the rest, one can say, do not cause different interpretations”. On August 1, 2008, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Matthew Bryza announced some details of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Bryza’s statement stated that “A referendum will be held to determine the Karabakh people themselves” and “The people of Nagorno-Karabakh will decide for themselves whether the republic will come under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan or become independent” (Nazim Muzaffarli., H. Aliyev.1996).
On 2 August, the head of the international relations department of the executive office of the President of Azerbaijan, Novruz Mammadov, stated that a referendum would be possible in 15-20 years and only after the liberation of seven occupied areas and the return of Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs to their places of residence.

On November 2, 2008, the Mayendorf Declaration was signed by the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia in the Moscow Region. In particular, it stated that the parties “confirm the importance of the mediation efforts continued by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, taking into account their meeting with the parties in Madrid on November 29, 2007 and subsequent discussions to further develop the basic principles of a political settlement.”

July 10, 2009, in the Italian city of L'Aquila during the summit of the "Big Eight" 1 adopted a joint statement by the presidents of the countries co-chairing the Minsk Group of OSCE - Russia, France and the United States. The statement published the main principles of the Karabakh settlement and instructed the co-chairs to present an updated version of the Madrid document of 2007 to the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

**Madrid principles.**

In December 2009, the updated Madrid principles were presented to the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, and in January 2010 to the President of Armenia, Serzh Sarksyan, by the co-chairs of the Minsk Group.

March 5, 2010 in Paris, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov (2010) brought to the attention of the mediators that Azerbaijan, apart from some exceptions, generally accepts the document proposed on the basis of the updated Madrid proposals. In March, the President of Azerbaijan announced his acceptance of the principles with "minor exceptions" and in June, he voiced the position that “Azerbaijan, in principle, agrees with the updated Madrid principles. True,
in these proposals (updated Madrid principles), there are certain points that can not satisfy us, but they are the most technical and editorial.

The “road map” in relation to the Karabakh settlement was actively discussed at the junction of 2009-2010, when the idea of a settlement process was put forward at a political and expert level through the creation of a “road map”. At the end of 2009, Kazakhstan, as the OSCE chairman-state, declared its readiness to offer Armenia and Azerbaijan a plan for resolving the conflict according to a “road map”.

It was stated that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kanat Saudabayev, announced the creation of “a road map” for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Before that, he visited Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and made sure that there were positive changes in the positions of the sides.” (http://www.georgiatimes.info)

Already in October 2010, a few days before the Astrakhan meeting of the three presidents, US Representative to the OSCE, Jan Kelly, noting the anxiety of the situation on the ceasefire line in the Karabakh conflict zone, stated that at this stage “the most important thing is that the parties continue to talk each other to ensure a diplomatic process. “Regarding the expectations of American diplomacy from the upcoming OSCE Summit in Astana, J. Kelly (2010) mentioned the possibility of a "road map" in the Karabakh settlement in the context of "inviting the parties to at least agree on a certain" road map "to resolve the conflict" (https://www.georgiatimes.info).

The development and implementation of a roadmap by international organizations in relation to the process of resolving complex inter-state conflicts is not something new. (Epstein A., 2009) Several years ago, international organizations attempted to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by adopting a road map. The roadmap for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was published by the US State Department on behalf of the Quartet of international mediators (USA, EU, Russia, UN) on April 30, 2003.
The “road map” of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which was approved at the highest level of international mediation, was never implemented, and few people remember it today. The "road map" of the Palestinian-Israeli settlement was formulated precisely as a step-by-step process with its specific stages, when each subsequent stage logically follows from the implementation of the previous one.

The “road map” of any process of settling an interstate conflict is a plan for achieving political goals, which means, first of all, a plan for political settlement. That is, it is supposed to solve political and legal issues with the help of international organizations.

As the international practice shows, the “road map” has two outcomes: either an actual breakthrough (which has not yet been observed in international practice), or a lack of settlement dynamics (which is almost always the case).

International organizations propose the settlement of the Armenian- Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with the help of the “roadmap”. Analyzing international experience. International organizations consider that “one can hope that the presence of a “roadmap” in the Karabakh settlement will be another element of stability and a relative guarantee of non-proliferation of the conflict beyond its current type and spatial range” (Makkey O. 2010)

"The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the main threat to regional security and stability. The earliest resolution of this conflict based on international law is in the interests of all parties", Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev told Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite during a visit to Baku 2- May 3 Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev emphasized the phased principle of the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

“Armenia should demonstrate a constructive approach to the proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group, take a step forward and start moving out from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Only after that peace can be established in our region", the Azerbaijani President stressed. In this context, President
of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev recalled the report of the OSCE field assessment mission conducted in October 2010 in the territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh. The report clearly states that in the occupied territories the entire infrastructure is destroyed, there are facts of illegal settlement. Attempts are being made to change the historical names of districts, administrative borders; there are many other evidences of the aggressive policy of Armenia.

There are also seven regions of Azerbaijan under occupation, located outside the administrative borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. We suffer from a policy of ethnic cleansing. One million Azerbaijanis found themselves in the position of refugees and internally displaced persons in their native land.

About 20% of the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan is under occupation. Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan. Of course, the conflict must be resolved on the basis of the norms and principles of international law. "It should be noted that the OSCE tried to directly participate in resolving the conflict, but was largely pushed aside by the great powers - the co-chairs of the Minsk Group". In fact, the United States, Russia and France, and not the OSCE, are deciding the fate of the conflict in highland Karabakh (Nazim Muzaffarli., H. Aliyev.1996).

The OSCE Lisbon Summit played a particularly important role in shaping the principles for resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. National leader Heydar Aliyev described his role in the Lisbon summit: “I am convinced that the work carried out in Lisbon in connection with the conflict situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the decisions made at the Lisbon meeting will bring its benefit to security and cooperation in Europe. During the period of participation and stay at the Lisbon summit, I thought about what Azerbaijan would receive from this summit, tried for the sake of the interests of Azerbaijan".
Heydar Aliyev played a special role in attracting the OSCE to the problem of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan as an independent state since 1992 has participated in OSCE summits, but there was no benefit from such participation.

In 1992, the Azerbaijani delegation headed by the President of Azerbaijan participated in the summit held in Helsinki. “But, unfortunately, we cannot understand what was involved in this, which delegation of Azerbaijan carried out activities. After all, 1992 was very difficult and difficult for Azerbaijan. First, Azerbaijan only gained independence then. And secondly, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in 1992, we can say, reached its most terrible level. In such a situation, of course, it was possible to effectively use the OSCE summit. But, apparently, this did not happen” (A. Javadov, 2003).

Heydar Aliyev managed to defend the interests of Azerbaijan at the OSCE Istanbul Summit (1999), which was one of the biggest events of the twentieth century, because it discussed the security of countries in the 21st century, peace, democracy and a number of related issues. During the Istanbul Summit, contracts were signed on the main oil pipeline - the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline for exporting Azerbaijani oil to world markets, as well as documents on the Caspian gas pipeline, that is, the transportation of Turkmen gas to Turkey through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Therefore, the Istanbul Summit, being a great historical event for Europe, the world, at the same time, is a double historical event for Azerbaijan.

The Armenian delegation at the Istanbul Summit began to talk about the oil blackmail of Azerbaijan. “I can safely say that the OSCE Istanbul Summit has been above all previous summits since 1975, when their foundation was laid. Azerbaijan considers its participation and representation in the OSCE summit to be a great historical event.
The Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Caspian gas pipeline are, of course, of political importance. We do not deny this. These documents, signed by us from both economic and political interests, were received in some countries with strong protest, but we will further develop our industry and international cooperation” (www.aliyev-heritage.org).

Subscribed to Istanbul Agreement construction of the Baku-Ceyhan and Trans-Caspian gas pipeline had no only energy focus. They became a catalyst for political life the whole Black Sea-Caspian region, since GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) was created, which Armenia could not enter. The key idea of creating GUAM was the transportation of Caspian energy carriers to European market. Events like in Istanbul and so at member countries of the GUUAM testified the alliance’s gradual shift in emphasis from economic issues, i.e. creating transport corridors on military and political. GUUAM was created with the support of the United States. Countries included in this association, began to develop close co-operation with NATO countries in Partnership for Peace and increasingly move away from of Russia.

The development and promotion of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan was carried out by the High Level Planning Group (Group of planning of a high level - GPHL) OSCE, but at the moment, its efforts have not been crowned with success. It should be noted that the OSCE tried to directly participate in resolving the conflict, but was largely pushed aside by the great powers - the co-chairs of the Minsk Group. "In fact, the United States, Russia and France, and not the OSCE, are deciding the fate of the conflict in highland Karabakh" (H.Aliyev.1999).

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summit, I thought about what Azerbaijan would receive from this summit, tried for the sake of the interests of Azerbaijan. Therefore, our desire, our goal was to achieve great success here. I recall that within two years after the Budapest meeting prior to the Lisbon meeting, Azerbaijan fully respected the cease-fire. We have done a very big and very serious work in preparing our position at the Lisbon summit. We set out to move forward, taking into account the work that we carried out during the period from the Budapest Summit to the Lisbon. We had meetings and negotiations in Helsinki, in Vienna, we worked fruitfully” (N. Muzaffarli., H. Aliyev 1996).

It is very important to note that during the work of the Lisbon summit, the situation for Azerbaijan was very difficult, although according to preliminary agreements a resolution should be adopted that would support the right to integrity and indivisibility of the state (Azerbaijan Day of the Day, 2010). The Azerbaijani delegation got acquainted with the prepared declaration, in which there was a paragraph relating to the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, this item was completely neutral, it did not identify the aggressor and the victim, and did not indicate a violation of the integrity of Azerbaijani territory.

“Our main goal was not reflected in the draft Declaration”, - said Heydar Aliyev (H. Aliyev, 1996).

“Our main goal was to approve or endorse at the Lisbon summit the most acceptable formula for a fair resolution of the issues of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the future. This formula was that the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan should be recognized by all countries, including Armenia, the solution of the Armenian- Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be implemented only within the framework of the recognition of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. But due to the fact that Armenia has always opposed this thesis and expressed strong protest to it during the preparatory period, the preparatory group was not able to achieve the inclusion of these concepts in the draft Lisbon Declaration.
There was a clause that confirmed that negotiations were going on, but they did not bring any results. Negotiations should continue in the future, there should be a compromise and the issue should be resolved peacefully - its overall content was this” (H. Aliyev. 1996)

There is no doubt that the national leader could not agree with such a draft Lisbon Declaration. Therefore, as Heydar Aliyev later recalled, he personally held many responsible meetings, negotiations, gave decisive instructions to our representatives in the preparatory group to fight for changing the draft Lisbon Declaration. “These instructions consisted in the fact that in the project put forward last time in Helsinki by the co-chairs of the Minsk Group there was an acceptable formula for solving the conflict. It consisted of three elements, points: recognition territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, granting high status of autonomy to the Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan and guaranteeing the security of the entire population of Nagorno-Karabakh. The goal was to achieve the inclusion of this formula in the draft declaration of the Lisbon Summit.

Extremely hard work was done. Finally, we managed to include this draft in the draft declaration. This is reflected in the 20th paragraph. True, this item does not fully suit us. But we saw that it was impossible to achieve the best. We thought that if these three principles consisting of those three elements are reflected there, it will give an opportunity to take them as a basis in further negotiations.

I used all the features. At all the talks, the heads of state, high-ranking representatives of individual states fully endorsed and confirmed the validity of our demands. Many managers frankly agreed with me that the 20th paragraph of the declaration was supposed to be. However, the OSCE has the principle of consensus. If a country does not give consent, the principle of consensus is violated, then the question cannot be included in the document that will be adopted, and no one can prevent it” (H. Aliyev.1996).
However, the Armenian side opposed the 20th point, such a destructive position of the Armenian side did not allow to reach a consensus. The national leader was forced to take a very bold and decisive step, which the Armenian side did not expect. Heydar Aliyev said that if the 20th point is not adopted, Azerbaijan will not give consensus on the entire declaration. This would mean the failure of the Lisbon summit itself. Later, Heydar Aliyev recalled that this was the only true tactical maneuver. Nationwide leader managed to gain time. “A new band of particularly intensive negotiations has begun, which were measured not in hours, but in minutes. As a result, the negotiations held on December 2 and continuing from the night of December 2 to the 3rd, the negotiations started in the early morning of December 3 showed that Azerbaijan would not back down from its position.

The heads of state of the OSCE member states and all the summit organizers saw a real danger that not a single document could accept the summit. After that, I received suggestions on ways out of the situation. I replied that only and only the adoption of the 20th paragraph of the Declaration can be a way out. I stated that the heads of the delegations should not work with me, but should meet with the Armenian President and explain the whole situation with him, so that he would agree to save the 20th item” (aliyev - heritage.org)

Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan, speaking at the OSCE Lisbon Summit on Nagorno-Karabakh, said that Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be part of Azerbaijan and this issue can only be resolved on the basis of the principle of self-determination. And if Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, then Azerbaijan will massacre against the Armenians. A map of the long-suffering Armenian people and genocide was played. Despite Armenian provocations, Heydar Aliyev again began active diplomatic negotiations and personal consultations and conversations, which forced the OSCE leaders to prepare new proposals. So the national leader broke the Armenian attempts to recognize the integrity of the Azerbaijani land (A. Jafarov, 2003).
New proposals were prepared by the Russian Federation, the United States of America, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti, and representatives of several large states. This proposal and the statement of the OSCE chairman presented me to President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev an hour before the start of the last summit meeting. “I got acquainted with him, made some amendments. I stated that if this statement is accepted, I can withdraw my protest and give a consensus of the declaration of the Lisbon summit, only that this summit The OSCE was not inconclusive. So, it happened. All those who watched the last meeting of the Lisbon summit, saw that I had received an offer, I said that I would not withdraw my protest, the 20th paragraph should remain. Armenian President did not withdraw his protest. Then they asked me what I would do if such a statement was made? I asked to read the statement. After he was read, I stated that if such a statement was adopted and included in the documents of the OSCE Lisbon Summit, then I would give consent to the adoption of the declaration. And so, it happened” (H. Aliyev, 1996).

With his characteristic modesty, the national leader recalled his role at the Lisbon summit. But it is known that after the speech of Heydar Aliyev, statements were made by the Chairman of the OSCE, Mr. Flavio Cotti, and all the OSCE members approved the Lisbon Declaration. There were separate comments, in particular, the representative of the United States of America, the leaders of the co-chair countries of the Minsk Group, the head of the Russian delegation, the head of the delegation of Turkey, made the Prime Minister of Ireland’s statement on behalf of the European Union and said that the Lisbon Declaration was supported by all European Member States Union.

CONCLUSIONS.

Thanks to the wise and persistent position of nationwide leader Heydar Aliyev, a great victory was achieved at the Lisbon summit.
For the first time, at the level of the OSCE summit, there were principles for resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, consistent with the OSCE Charter. These were the following principles: recognition of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, provision of high self-government status to Azerbaijan and provision of security guarantees to the entire population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Speaking at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev said: “The Azerbaijani side will continue to make efforts to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by peaceful means. We will remain committed to the ceasefire regime, we will try to resolve the issue peacefully, the direct negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, conducted by representatives of both presidents, will continue. I believe that after the OSCE adopted the Lisbon Declaration, the OSCE Minsk Group should negotiate in the framework of this fundamental document. I think that a good basis has been created for our future work on resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by peaceful means” (Heydar Aliyev.1996).

Heydar Aliyev played a special role in attracting the OSCE to the problem of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan as an independent state since 1992 has participated in OSCE summits. But there was no benefit from such participation. In 1992, the Azerbaijani delegation headed by the President of Azerbaijan participated in the summit held in Helsinki. “But, unfortunately, we cannot understand what was involved in this, which delegation of Azerbaijan carried out activities. After all, 1992 was very difficult and difficult for Azerbaijan. First, Azerbaijan only gained independence then. And secondly, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in 1992, we can say, reached its most terrible level. In such a situation, of course, it was possible to effectively use the OSCE summit. But, apparently, this did not happen”.
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