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TÍTULO: El papel de Arabia Saudita en la creación de tensiones religiosas en la región de Baluchistán, Irán.

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RESUMEN: Este documento utiliza un enfoque descriptivo-analítico utilizando la teoría de la disuasión para predecir las causas de la participación saudita en los asuntos étnico-religiosos en la región de Baluchistán, Irán; entonces, la pregunta es: "¿Qué papel juega Arabia Saudita en las tensiones étnico-religiosas en la región de Baluchistán?" En respuesta, pone a prueba la hipótesis de que "Arabia Saudita está utilizando razones políticas e ideológicas para usar su poder en la región fronteriza para crear tensión, debido a su afiliación religiosa con los residentes iraníes de Baluchistán". Los resultados de la investigación muestran que para poner fin a la interferencia del país en los asuntos internos iraníes, los gobiernos de Irán y Arabia Saudita deben mejorar las relaciones regionales y nacionales con los vecinos y grupos afiliados a los dos países de la región.

PALABRAS CLAVES: Arabia Saudita, tensiones religiosas, región de Baluchistán.

TITLE: The role of Saudi Arabia in creating religious tensions in the Balochistan region of Iran.

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ABSTRACT: This paper uses a descriptive-analytical approach using deterrence theory to predict the causes of Saudi involvement in ethnic-religious affairs in Iran's Baluchistan region; so, the question is, "What role does Saudi Arabia play in ethnic-religious tensions in the Balochistan region?" In response, it tests the hypothesis that "Saudi Arabia is using political and ideological reasons to use its power in the border region to create tension, because of its religious affiliation with Iranian Balochistan residents". As the results of the research show, to end the country's interference in Iranian internal affairs, the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia must improve regional and denational relations with neighbors and groups affiliated with the two countries in the region.

KEY WORDS: Saudi Arabia, religious tensions, Balochistan region.

INTRODUCTION.

Iran and Saudi Arabia are considered major powers in the Middle East, each seeking to increase its influence in this region and in the Islamic world. This has led to an ever-increasing competition between the two countries, both before and after the Islamic Revolution of Iran, although after the revolution, the competition increased in the sphere of influence and influence among Islamic countries.

In general, the rivalry between the two countries has had a dramatic effect on relations between the two countries and has led to many ups and downs. In the course of these relations, the two countries

sometimes stand against each other on regional, cultural and religious issues, and sometimes they have worked together on mutual interests (Ghorbani and Sangdaninee, 2014:2-3).

The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia has undergone some changes since September 11, 2001. The geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and its impact on the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia can be described in four periods: before the Islamic Revolution, after the Islamic Revolution until the end of the Iran-Iraq War, from the end of the war to September 11, and from September 11. These four periods influenced by global, regional and internal factors, have led to different types of relationships. Sometimes, the peaceful behavior of the rivals has been variable in gaining regional leadership before the Islamic Revolution to hostile behavior in 1981. Subsequently, this kind of growing peaceful relationship has dominated regional cooperation and regional integration, especially after 9/11, and new developments in the region, including the fall of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein (Hafez Nia and Mohammad, 2005:1).

This research examines the causes and ways of Saudi involvement in ethnic and religious affairs in the Balochistan region of Iran and the creation of ethnic and religious tensions in this border region. Therefore, it poses the question: "What role does Saudi Arabia play in ethnic-religious tensions in the Balochistan region?" And tests the hypothesis that "the country of Saudi Arabia has a religious affiliation with Balochistan residents, due to reasons Political and ideological use of their power in the border area to create tension".

The significance of the present research is that the Iranian society has several ethnicities including Azeri, Kurdish, Baluchi, Turkmen and Arabs, as well as several linguistic and Islamic groups and have a high religious bond with Saudi Arabia. The distribution of these groups across the geographic map of Iran is such that uniformly the whole Iranian soil is mosaically different from these ethnic groups.

The existence of ethnic-religious norms and different languages makes these tribes and groups separate, often dependent on the transboundary sequences in different geographical regions of Iran. Therefore, the existence of these elements of the segregation of the demographic section leads us to categorically consider ethnic-religious gaps as one of the most important divisions of the social structure of Iran.

The theoretical framework of the present research is the theory of deterrence, which is based on the method of realism. Inhibition, increasing the possibility of stopping an opponent's offensive attack by persuading him to be unwittingly attacked or overcoming the threat posed by the attack.

Inhibition as one of the fundamental concepts in the realistic analysis of power, another aspect of the traditional concept of balance of power and the form of influence in international relations and society without transcendental authority, is the driving force behind the readiness and orientation of national policies in an autonomy based on the obvious existence of the enemy and the polar relationship of balance of power and maintaining the status quo (in terms of stability on the frontiers and immunity of territorial integrity) is considered vital, which, regardless of military practice, will support diplomacy and foreign policy.

The deterrence policy is potentially affecting environmental threats. The type of threats and the severity of them are effective in shaping this policy and its nature. Therefore, considering the evolution of the quantity and quality of threats, the definitions of defense deterrence have also been transformed. Indeed, the attainment of the ultimate goal of deterrence is to prevent the objectivity of finding and surviving an external threat without bearing the hefty military-security costs of different hosts and resources, which can be distinguished from hard and soft deterrence (Saed, 2010:11).

The permanent inflammation of the Middle East security environment has forced regional governments to expand their extensive military capabilities and provide conventional and unconventional weapons in a widespread form called "Hard deterrence." It also forces states to use

more and more precisely their political, cultural and economic capabilities to confront their opponents, which they call "soft deterrence". Meanwhile, due to the remarkable superiority of the Islamic Republic of Iran in challenging areas in the Middle East, its main rivals, including Saudi Arabia, have made Saudi use of its soft deterrent capabilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of these existing rituals is interference in ethnic-religious affairs in different parts of Iran.

The method of data analysis of this research is divided into two groups: 1. Historical method, which is based on historical sources and texts for analyzing and writing the historical sections of the paper; 2. Empirical method, based on which the explicit data and the measurement of research are investigated and they are cited.

The present research is divided into five sections: The first part of the general research that reviews the subject. The second part examines a number of stressors between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The third section examines the position of Saudi Arabia in promoting ethnic concerns in Sistan and Baluchestan province. In Section 4, the causes of the country's interference in the religious affairs of the country are investigated and the conclusion in the fifth section is discussed.

DEVELOPMENT.

Stress factors between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Here are four examples of major differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia:

Cultural ideological conflicts.

Since Saudi Arabia and Iran define their national identity on the basis of religious concepts, religious differences can be considered as an important element in the relations between the two countries. When the Wahhabi groups came to power in Saudi Arabia, they laid the groundwork for a new geopolitical and ideological contradiction with Iran. Such contradictions can be considered during the reign of Reza Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The main focus of Wahab's ideology is the fight against Shi'ism in Iran and other countries in the region. Saudi Arabia carries out such an action on the basis of Arabic indifference, regional tribalism and its distinctive identity with Iran. Saudi Arabia also uses such indicators in its security relations with other Middle Eastern countries. Based on the religious and ideological approach of the Saudi authorities, issues such as democracy, freedom, and human rights have nothing to do with Arab identity. Therefore, Saudi Arabia analyzes any political change in the Middle East based on Arab identity and Salafi Sunni religion, which has led Iran and Saudi Arabia to compete in the Middle East (Motaghi, 2010:55).

From the ideological point of view and the discourse of power and political legitimacy, Iran and Saudi Arabia are in opposition. The Iranian government has laid out the teachings of two of the most prominent Shiite clerics of Imam Khomeini who proposed the Waliyat Fiqiyah and Shahid Mohammad Bagher Sadr, who introduced the Islamic Republic's theory, but the Saudi government is back to unity with Mohammed bin Saud and Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab. Given the differences in the teachings of Wahhabism and Shi'ism, Iran and Saudi Arabia are unwilling to face each other.

Event of September 11, 2001.

Events, such as the occupation of the American Embassy in 1978, the Iran-Iraq War, the overthrow of the Iranian passenger plane by the United States in 1366, and Iran's nuclear program were among the most influential events in Iran's foreign relations since the 1979 revolution.

Although Iran's relations with the United States and Israel were the most challenging part of Iran's foreign relations, Iran's relations with the Islamic countries, the Middle East and its neighbors have been ups and downs. Temporary interruption of relations with Saudi Arabia after the 1981 Hajj, a dispute with the United Arab Emirates in the possession of the three large Tang Islands, Tang-e-Mink and Abu Musa, the blurring of relations with Bahrain following Bahrain's charge of Iranian

support for dissatisfied Shiites, following the support of Iran for Khaled Estambullah's actions, the blurring of relations with Kuwait due to the Iran-Iraq War, and the blurring of relations with Jordan are examples of the tensions after the Islamic Revolution (Movassaghi, 2016: 44-45).

With September 11, 2001, following the collapse of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the regional power of Iran increased, and the regional power cycle in the Middle East was beneficial to Iran, as Saudi Arabia's allied governments were declining in the region, and on Iran's allies, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen added. This action triggered a reaction by the Saudi government and other allies. To the point where the King of Jordan condemned Iran as a Shiite crescent and accused the Islamic Republic of seeking to establish an Iranian empire (Cerioli, 2018:8-18).

Arab Spring.

In 2009, when the Middle East region was involved in the Arab Spring, a number of Saudi Arabian states collapsed, or they were in conflict and internal disputes. In this regard, Iran is also sponsoring self-financing groups and allies. In countries such as Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and Iraq, the rivalry of the two countries has intensified to infiltrate, causing many political changes in these countries and the way in which interethnic groups interact (Haveshki, 2015:2-4). In explaining the current state of the regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is possible to examine the situation in several centers of the crisis in the region:

(A) Disagreement over Palestine: Iran wants to maintain resistance to complete Palestinian liberation and Saudi Arabia seeks to establish peace between Arabs and Israel. **(B)** Disagreements over Hezbollah Lebanon: Iran sees Hezbollah as an effective force against Israel's excesses and always emphasizes its strengthening, while Saudi Arabia regards Hezbollah as an essential element in the spread of unrest in the region and the Arab-Israeli peace process. **(C)** Competition in New Iraq: Iran is attempting to activate the way for the establishment of Shi'ite rule in Iraq, with the

expansion of its influence in Iraq, while Saudi Arabia does not accept Shiite rule in Iraq. **(D)** Competition in the Syrian crisis: Iran has sought to maintain Assad since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, and in this way, all efforts have been made to eliminate all the insecurity and survivors of the Assad dynasty. In this process, he even has military and logistical assistance to Syria, while Saudi Arabia wants to eliminate Assad and supports the Takfiri and Sunni opposition groups against Assad (Ghantous, Georgy, 2019 3-6). **(E)** The difference in viewpoint on the goals and results of Iran's nuclear policy: Saudi Arabia has always tried to introduce Iran's nuclear program as a military program, and it is considered as the driving force behind the nuclear rivalry in the Middle East.

This attempt by Saudi Arabia has intensified due to the progress of Iran's nuclear program and its strategic implications for balancing regional power with the recent developments in the periphery, "like the fall of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq as a balancing force in Iran, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the strengthening of Hamas's relations with Iran" (Shojaee, 2011:32).

Associated Groups of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The two countries sought to create their own militia groups in the Middle East to counteract the threats posed by each other and maintain their national interests in the region. Among the pro-Iranian groups include the Habibullah groups in Lebanon, Hasht al-Sha'abi in Iraq, Ansarullah in Yemen, the Fatimid and Zimbabwean in Syria, including groups from Saudi Arabia, including al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq, The Islamic State of the Dinner, Al-Qaeda Dinner, Ahrar Al-Sham and so on.

In some Middle Eastern countries, there have been advocates of the two countries that have created tensions between the two countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and each of these countries refers to affiliated groups as terrorists and within the framework of the "Fight against Terrorist" They fight

with them. In this regard, both countries supported the opposition within the borders of each other in a variety of ways; for example, Iran's response to the assassination of Sheikh Nimrannar by the government of Saudi Arabia, which caused the conflict at Tehran's embassy, resulted in the interruption of political relations between the two countries. And Saudi-sponsored military-financial support from ethnic religious groups opposed to the Islamic regime in the border areas of Iran can be cited. (Hilterman, 2007).

Saudi role in ethnic tensions in Sistan and Baluchistan province.

Saudi Arabia, is one of the centers of high schools of religion in the world and the region, provides free religious education services to Sunni religious scholars in Iran. The effect of these organized propaganda has been at least two aspects of Iran's national security as a threat; reducing and reducing national identities and nationalities in favor of religious identities. The first threat is the expansion of Wahhabi thinking, especially in the eastern and southeastern Iran. Promotion of this thinking, especially the efforts to develop various religious organizations, in addition to strengthening the divergence energy of these areas towards the central core of the government, has increased the convergence of Sunni Sunni and Hanafi Baluchi eastern and southeast Iran (Golrangi, 2015:62-97).

The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf, the Middle East, the Arab world and Islam, and even in the international arena, is indicative of their limited ability to expand bilateral cooperation, but the root of the main conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia should be sought in religious matters Expansion of Pakistani extremist ties with Saudi Arabia and the continuation and strengthening of the support of the Afghan Taliban and the support of paramilitary battles through extremist Islamists in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and the countries of Central Asia and ... have

had unpleasant effects on the interests of Iran and other countries. Saudi Arabia has the largest share in equipping, organizing and strengthening Pakistani radical groups.

Unofficial statistics indicate that there are about 20,000 religious schools in Pakistan. It is worth mentioning that more than 1,549,244 students study at these schools, with Saudi Arabia having the largest share in equipping these schools. Establishment of religious seminaries and the recruitment of religious scholars, the construction of universities, libraries and mosques, shops in the form of Wahhabi propaganda, the entry of some people in some service and relief businesses in some charities, etc., with the propaganda and Wahabism is being promoted from Saudi Arabia (Mohammadi and Ahmadi, 2016:12).

The arrival of Salafi clerics in Sistan and Baluchestan province, which are often close to the religious culture of Saudi Arabia, mainly from Indian and Pakistani schools of thought for the promotion of fundamentalist thoughts, as well as the spread of Wahhabi's ideas, which, with biased and political views, have contradict Shiite religion It also recognizes the role of local authorities as indisputable in religious and ethnic discriminatory practices, making Balochistan become one of the central areas of Iran (Keshavarz, 2014).

Before the creation of al-Qaeda, the Sunnis of Iran had no definite pattern and policy, but after the activities of al-Qaeda and bin Laden, a small part of the Sunnis, adopted the organization's model. Particularly among young people, they have been influenced by many social activities, their expectations and expectations, and the expectation of participation in social, political and cultural sectors, with the same approach. The outcome of these moves is to exacerbate religious differences and negative stances. A look at ethnic movements in recent years has shown that the ethnic challenge in different parts of the country, in terms of the emergence of the emergence, has, in particular, the ethnic heritage of religious backgrounds in the East. In the meantime, extremist

groups in Pakistan, influenced by Saudi Arabia, have their cultural effects, and this phenomenon is remarkable for those part of the Sunni people who have extreme tendencies.

Considering the Taliban and al-Qaeda's thoughts and the emphasis on creating a global government and fighting central states that have not been affecting the Sunni people, and especially the youth, it is probable that groups that want to take actions or provocations against the Islamic Republic of Iran are likely to be formed. The Jundallah group led by Abdul Malik Rigi confirms this issue (Keshavarz, 2014).

Wahhabism in the Balochistan region of Iran has also been well-placed for promotion and development. The existence of the Sunni Hanafi who are decisive for Shi'a, the freedom of the Wahhabis in Pakistan as well as the ethnic affinity of the Baloch with the overseas, the economic, cultural and social poverty, and the religious differences of the center and the periphery in Iran, along with Wahabion's propaganda that the Iranian government has been a Shiite system, and not an Islamic government has contributed to the development of Wahhabism. Examples of such groups are the Al-Furqan Party of Balochistan Iran, which is a largely religious organization, and the dissident Rumi is active in the Iranian Shiite regime. This party in Pakistan is affiliated with the Sahaba Army, which is ideologically oriented to the Deobandi School. Through the activities of the Wahhabi propaganda groups, Sunni extremists who sought to eliminate discrimination and protect the Sunni sanctities grew up in the area.

The influence of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on the tradition of Iran has widened in recent years, as religious and secular universities in Saudi Arabia give the Iranian Students an annual amount of attention to scholarship. The same applies to Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan has become a security challenge in relations between the two countries with the strengthening of extremist groups on the Iranian borders and the training of their religious and operative forces on their soil. Promotion of Wahhabi religious thoughts, especially the efforts to form multiple religious organizations, in

addition to strengthening the divergence energy of these areas towards the central core of the government, has increased the convergence of Sunni Sunni and Hanifa Baluchi eastern and southeastern parts of Iran.

There are also some terrorist groups such as Jandallah, in the newer form of the Ansar and the 'Adal Movement', in Sistan and Baluchistan and with some radical scholars in Pakistan that are under the command of military training of some elements of al-Qaeda. These groups carry out terrorist operations inside Iran's soil and burgeon and hide behind Pakistani soil after being murdered inside Iran (Kanani and Fadavi, 2016:13).

Challenging these currents makes provincial security issues more complicated, so that with the anti-Shiite approach of these groups to flood Shiite and Sunni conflicts and the Sistine and Baluchistan controversy, the hatred of Sunnis from the Sistineas as a factor of government led to a high level of tensions. Following the same propaganda strategy, the Jundallah group, headed by Abdul Malik Rigi, had been carrying out terrorist operations since 2005 and attempted to justify such acts using Wahhabi literature.

The role of Pakistan and Saudi intelligence agencies is also remarkable in this regard. This has led to the concentration of the country's military, security and intelligence forces in Sistan and Baluchistan and has led to multi-level militancy in this area. Thus, on the one hand, the police have traditionally been fighting the trafficking phenomenon and providing security in the province. On the other hand, with the increase in insecurity and the presence of al-Qaeda forces in the region, the Revolutionary Guard was sent to the region for cultural and military struggle. Finally, the influence of the security organizations of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in fundamentalist movements also called for the presence of Iran's intelligence to combat them (Tolouiee, 2016:9-10).

In order to prevent the occurrence of ethnic-religious issues, there must be a general public participation in the community, regardless of ethnicity, religion, language, race or culture, all peoples should be involved in equal decisions and decisions. In a multi-ethnic society, the movement for establishing national unity, respecting the rights of ethnic groups and eliminating the grounds for any inequitable inter-ethnic indoctrination will create the grounds for national security. The issue that the Baloch and Sunnis are currently asking for is national participation. The reason for this is also clear, because ethnicities have come to the conclusion that if a person from a regional level has a degree in management, then that region will grow dramatically.

In the current sensitive situation of Sistan and Baluchestan province, there is a cross between religious demands and demands, this stage is one of the most sensitive and complex historical passages that cannot be managed except by thinking and thinking, managing and modifying the existing religious and religious beliefs. It passed well and guaranteed the security of the province and the country. (Naghizadeh, 2016).

Causes of Saudi interference in religious affairs of Iran.

Although Iran and Saudi Arabia are both recognized as Muslim countries and collaborate with the Organization of the Islamic Conference, ideological issues are one of the main factors that have compromised the two countries, and this has negatively affected the cooperation of the two countries.

Continuing the pressure of Saudi extremist organizations against the Shiites and possibly Iran's supportive measures has affected the relations between the two countries and may intensify the reactions between them. One of the most important features that makes these ideological issues more exaggerated is Saudi Arabia's unification with the United States and the presence of global powers in the country. Another important factor is Wahhabi, which has spread across the region by

Saudi Arabia. The Saudis became more active in spreading this thinking in the world. The group led the formation of new dialects in global geopolitics by managing some terrorist acts, such as the organization of the September 11 events. Including the discourse on the war on terrorism, which provided the context for the presence of trans-regional powers in the vicinity of Iran) Mehrabi and Attarnezhad, 2014:14-15).

Iran and Saudi Arabia have never had a positive perception because of their distinctive Iranian-Arab identity and the rivalry between the two countries in the Gulf region and the Middle East. Before the Islamic Revolution and in the second Pahlavi era, these two countries were inevitably under the influence of the ruling Cold War and bipolar discourse, and in particular to prevent Soviet influence in the region. The two countries were partly upset by fears of another Western rival, Iraq, under the two-sided policy of Nixon-Kissinger, which, with the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution, lost two-pillar politics.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran led not only to the continuation of the geopolitics of the two countries but also to the revival of the Shiites of the region, which added the ideological factor to the rivalry between the two countries. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the United States lost one of its special allies and one of its strategic spheres of influence. Hence, Saudi Arabia presented itself as a serious replacement for Iran. After Saudi Arabia became a strategic ally of the United States in the region. It is aligned with America as Iran-US relationship is dark after the Islamic Revolution. In other words, the presence and influence of one of the non-aligned countries with the Islamic Republic of Iran in Saudi Arabia has led to a breakdown of the shared mentality and values between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the wall of distrust between these two days is taller (Movassaghi, 2016: 142-147).

On the other hand, with the advent of the Islamic revolution, revolutionary Shi'ite ideology was seen as a powerful rival against the conservative Wahhabi Arab identity. In fact, Saudi Arabia was a kingdom based on the Wahhabi ideology against the Islamic Republic of Iran, a Shiite-dominated Waliyat Fiqiyah, each of which both claimed the leadership of the Islamic world. This competitor was not only Arab, but also Sunni, and in all respects different from Saudi Arabia. There was a serious struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world, and there is now a negative effect on the relations between the two countries. Of course, it should be noted that the attention of Saudi Arabia to the intellectual and political leadership of the Islamic world is raised before it comes from the origins of one billion and two hundred million Muslims in the world as national goals in the region and in the world (Eram, 2016: 5-15).

The relations between the two major countries of the Middle East and the Gulf region, Iran and Saudi Arabia, have always fluctuated between the pattern of coexistence and conflict. After the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a conflict pattern has dominated the relations between the two countries, which, according to many researchers, can be referred to as the Regional Cold War.

The main reason for this was the regional, ideological and geopolitical rivalry of the two countries. In fact, with the rule of the game with zero sum, the increase in the strength of each of these two regional actors is considered as a threat to the other. The pressure of Saudi Arabia and its allies on the Iraqi Shiite government, attempts to undermine the Shi'a and Hezbollah parties in Lebanon, support the Bahraini Sunni ruler, and prevent the establishment of democracy and power of the Shiites in Bahrain, and withdraw Syria from the queues of the allies of Iran by changing the regime in that country. With the support of extremist and jihadist groups, the power of Iran and the manifestation of the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the West are influenced by three elements of identity, geopolitics and structure (Eram, 2016: 5-15).

CONCLUSIONS.

The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia includes a wide field of competition; the Gulf, the Middle East, the Muslim world and the international arena. The two countries saw themselves as serious rivals to influence the Middle East, in particular, the Persian Gulf region, at least since the 1979 Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980's.

At best, cooperation between the two countries has been almost always suspicious. In addition, in 2011, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran was due to intense controversy over the wave of the Arab Spring's turmoil and Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain in support of its kingdom and Iran's support for Shi'ites, as well as the support of Bashar al-Assad in Syria And ... it took a wonderful direction .The rivalry between these two countries is often exacerbated by ideological and geopolitical differences, which increase their hostility during regional turbulences and unrest.

In general, ideological and geopolitical rivalries between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf region, and the recent developments in Bahrain, Yemen, as well as their indirect encounters in Syria, make it difficult to reduce tensions in relations between the two countries. On the other hand, at the structural level of the international system, the negation of the role of Iran's stabilization in the regional order and the escalation of the Iran-Iran terror program, especially in the context of Iran's peaceful nuclear program, and in the region's regionalization of the Shiite element in regional politics in the light of developments in Iraq and then in Lebanon, Led to the sensitivity of the Arabs and Saudis towards Iran.

Therefore, both countries are pushing for various ways to increase the cost of implementing the policies of the other side in the region, in order to prevent the implementation of other plans to win this cold war. Considering the hypothesis of this research, it can be said that Saudi Arabia, using religious affiliation with Balochistan residents of Iran, has made important efforts such as the

possibility of free education for religious scholars, the payment of financial assistance to their groups, the promotion of Shiite fear, encouragement and accompaniment for the exercise of International sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran and to divert the regional policies of the Islamic Republic and to entertain its politicians in internal affairs.

In the wake of the expansion of existing tensions to other border provinces of the country, it has failed in most of the materials, because the national culture of Iran, which during thousands of years of peaceful life of ethnic groups and religious groups has created a certain amount of cultural integrity, which is a kind of national integrity. It is against the influence of foreigners, it prevents cultural and ethnic self-harm in Iran; of course, considering the economic issues, there are groups and individuals who are out of this cultural reach and are working towards the goals of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it can be said that the hypothesis of this research has been proved and Saudi Arabia has used its influence in the region of Balochistan to control its policies. Thus, with the improvement of the cultural and economic conditions of the border regions, it prevented the growth of affiliated groups in these areas.

To overcome the current state of relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two countries must reduce regional tensions and improve political relations, as the continuation of this process will reduce the gradual progress of these two major countries in the Middle East and the Islamic world, while the two countries. By emphasizing Islamic communion, you can help improve your relationship. Here are some of the ways to improve Iran-Saudi relations:

- Reducing religious tensions by giving more freedom to more Shiite and Sunni groups in both countries.
- Joint attention of the two countries to the issue of pilgrimage and pilgrimage.
- The emphasis on Islamic and Quranic unity in order to avoid divisions in the Islamic world.

-Creating communications for tourism at all levels for the people of the two countries to meet each other.

-Improving the political and international relations of the two countries.

-Improving economic relations between the two countries.

- Emphasizing national interests in relations between the two countries.

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