The inadmissibility of the constitutional judgment derived from the interpretation, a contrary sensu, of section XXIII, article 61, as well as of the various V, article 107, of the Amparo Law: a dynamic analysis on the origin of the constitutional judgment against acts issued in court that are not impossible to repair.

Abstract

In the present work, it is intended to carry out an analysis of the inadmissibility of the amparo when it is promoted against acts dictated within a trial and that do not materially affect substantive rights, which is intended to explain the legal term "impossible reparation"; a term that is still in a broad sense of interpretation, as well as the distinction of substantive law from adjective law is also intended in this article, with which it is intended the new legal paradigm of the Mexican amparo is made clear, away from the image of the predominant affectation established in the Law of Amparo, Regulatory of Articles 103 and 107 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.