Systems for appointing judges that make up constitutional courts or tribunals: Incidence in democracy, merits and populism to the indispensable pan-constitutionalism in Ecuador.

Abstract

In light of the pre-eminence that the pan-constitutionalism derived from the constitutional states grants to the High Courts, the importance of reviewing their legitimacy in the composition models emerges; dialectic on which it was possible to scientifically reveal the incidence of the systems of appointment of judges that make up Constitutional Courts or Tribunals in democracy, merits and populism to the indispensable pan-constitutionalism in Ecuador, using a qualitative route, longitudinal design, dogmatic, documentary and theoretical legal type, with exploratory and correlational scopes, and analytic-synthetic, inductive-deductive methods and a systemic approach; where, par excellence, a genuine system for appointing judges to make up the Constitutional Court of Ecuador was outlined.